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Alimony Modification and Cohabitation in North Carolina
Rising divorce rates,1 falling marriage rates, 2 and a growing incidence of

unmarried cohabitation 3 have combined to create an increasingly common situation: unmarried cohabitation between a dependent spouse 4 and a third party.
What effect should this cohabitation 5 have on a supporting spouse's 6 continued
duty to pay alimony 7 to the dependent spouse?8 This Note examines the various

ways in which states have dealt with this question, focuses on North Carolina's
treatment of the problem, and proposes a legislative solution.
The rationale underlying alimony awards never has been clear. 9 Histori-

cally, the fault of one or both of the parties in causing the marital dissolution
was considered sufficient reason for awarding alimony. 10 Today, financial need
is widely recognized as the primary justification for granting alimony awards.11
1. See H. CARTER & P. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
STUDY 28 (1976). For a summary of historical trends in American divorce, see Norton & Glick,
MaritalInstabilityin America: Past,Present, andFuture, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 7 (G. Levinger & 0. Moles ed. 1979).
2. See Blumberg, Cohabiting without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV.
1125, 1130 (1981) (noting that the marriage rates in Western countries have fallen sharply).
3. In 1980, 1,560,000 heterosexual couples shared a household, a 200% increase since 1970,
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES P-20, No. 365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980 (1981).
4. A "dependent spouse," also called a "recipient" or "payee" spouse, is defined by North
Carolina law as a spouse who is "actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or
her maintenance and support." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (1984).
5. Cohabitation has been defined as "a stable, more or less permanent relationship between
two persons who are not married... and who share living facilities." M. FREEMAN & C. LYON,
COHABITATION WITHOUT MARRIAGE 4 (1983).

For a more comprehensive definition of cohabita-

tion, see Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1131-36.
Although there are many kinds of cohabitation, including roommate situations, cohabitation
between relatives, and cohabitation based purely on financial considerations (such as boarding arrangements), this Note deals primarily with heterosexual cohabitation. Attempts to modify alimony
obligations based on same-sex cohabitation are rare. Oldham, Cohabitationby an Alimony Recipient
Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L. 615, 630 (1982). But see Kenney v. Kenney, 76 Misc. 2d 927, 352 N.Y.S.2d
344 (1974) (supporting spouse sought to terminate alimony based on alleged lesbian cohabitation of
dependent spouse). For a collection of cases and commentaries discussing the major legal issues
raised by cohabitation, see W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION
115-224 (1983).
6. The "supporting spouse" -the spouse who pays alimony to a dependent spouse-is also
called the "payor" spouse. A supporting spouse is defined in North Carolina law as one "upon
whom the other spouse is actually substantially dependent or from whom such other spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(4) (1984).
7. Alimony, also called "maintenance" or "spousal support," is "the allowance which a supporting spouse may be compelled to pay the dependent spouse for support and maintenance." 2 R.
LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW 137 (1980).
8. Another issue raised by such cohabitation that is outside the scope of this Note is cohabitation's effect on child custody rights. See Wadlington, Sexual RelationsAfter Separation or Divorce:
The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249, 263-65 (1977); Note,
Custody and the Cohabiting Parent, 20 J. FAM. L. 697 (1982).
9. Rationales advanced for alimony include punishment of the husband for wrongdoing, protection of the wife against becoming an economic burden on the state, and repayment of the wife's
investment in the marriage. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 421 (1968).
10. Id. at 421-22.
11. "The ability of the husband to pay and the needs of the wife may be said to constitute the
basic alimony equation." Deservine, Groundsfor Modification ofAlimony Awards, 6 LAW & CON-
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Modification 12 of alimony awards generally is allowed upon a showing of
"changed circumstances," 13 such as the death of one of the parties, 14 remarriage
of the dependent spouse, 15 or changed financial circumstances between the parties. 16 Determining whether changed financial circumstances exist usually entails an examination of the increase or decrease in the dependent spouse's needs,
17
as well as any decrease in the supporting spouse's ability to pay.
States have implemented both legislative I8 and judicial 19 solutions in reTEMP. PROBS. 236, 239 (1939). This increased emphasis on financial need as opposed to fault coincides with the rise of "no-fault" divorce. See R. EISLER, DISSoLtrioN & No-FAULT DIVORCE,
MARRIAGE AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 11 (1977) ("What we are seeing. . . is a fundamental
shift in social attitudes and values. No-fault divorce laws are one legal manifestation of that shift.");
Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty Stater An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 373-441 (1983)
("All American jurisdictions, except South Dakota, have some form of 'no-fault' divorce."); L.
Halem, Divorce Reform (1980) (discussing movement towards no-fault divorce in the United
States).
There is a growing trend towards "rehabilitative" or "term" alimony. Rehabilitative alimony is
"an equitable award given to a spouse, until the recipient develops an earning capacity or another
source of support is found." Oldham, supra note 5, at 632. The law in this area, however, is unsettled. See Foster, Alimony Awards, in AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE 1 (1978).
For an overview of recent changes in divorce law, see Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage,62 VA. L. REV. 663 (1976).
12. "Modification," as used in this Note, may be an increase, decrease, suspension, or termination of the original award.
13. Deservine, supra note 11, at 237.
14. H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 461-63.
15. Id. at 457-59. Remarriage of the supporting spouse will not affect the alimony award. Id.
16. Id. at 459-61. Under the modem view, post-divorce sexual activity of a dependent spouse
uniformly is rejected as a "changed circumstance" warranting alimony reduction or termination. Id.
at 463; see, eg., O'Dell v. O'Dell, 57 Ala. App. 185, 326 So. 2d 747 (1976) (post-divorce sexual
relations insufficient ground for alimony modification); McBrayer v. McBrayer, 227 Ga. 224, 179
S.E.2d 772 (1971) (ex-wife's post-divorce sexual conduct irrelevant to the continuation of alimony
payments); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d 407 (1971) (post-divorce sexual behavior did not rise to level of flagrant misconduct necessary to warrant modification of alimony). The
dependent spouse owes the supporting spouse "no greater duty to lead a pure and virtuous life than
she owes to society generally." Deservine, supra note 11, at 246.
17. H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 459-61. Increase of the dependent spouse's award because of
the increased income of the supporting spouse generally is not allowed; if the original alimony award
still satisfies the dependent spouse's needs, no modification is warranted. Id. at 460-61.
18. In 1934 New York enacted the first statute dealing with cohabitation's effect on alimony
obligations. Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 220, § 1, 1934 Laws of New York 703; see Oldham, The Effect
of Unmarried Cohabitationby a FormerSpouse Upon His or Her Right to Continue to Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249, 256 (1978). By 1981 six states had adopted some form of cohabitation
statute. Note, PropertyDivision and Alimony Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitationson Judicial
Discretion, 50 FoRDHAM L. REV. 415, 432-33 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, PropertyDivision
and Alimony Awards]. Today, 11 states have enacted statutes that allow modification of alimony
upon cohabitation of the dependent spouse. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-55 (1983) ("[A]limony. . .shall
be modified. . . upon proof that the [dependent spouse] . . . is living openly or cohabiting with a
member of the opposite sex."); CAL.CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Cum.Supp. 1984) ("[T]here shall be
a rebuttable presumption. . . of decreased need for support if the supported party is cohabiting with
a person of the opposite sex . . . . Upon a determination that circumstances have changed, the
court may modify the payment of support."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (West Cum. Supp.
1984) ("[court may] suspend, reduce or terminate. . .alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person. . . because the living arrangements cause
such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party"); GA. CODE. ANN. § 196-19 (Cum. Supp. 1984) ("[TIhe voluntary cohabitation of [the dependent spouse] with a third party
in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payments
.... 'Cohabitation' means dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd Cum.Supp.
1984) ("The obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated. . .if the party receiving mainte-
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sponse to problems presented by the cohabitation of a dependent spouse. In a
minority of states,20 alimony is terminated automatically upon proof of cohabitation of the dependent spouse with a third party. 2 1 Under the majority
nance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis."); LA. CiV. CODE ANN,
art. 160 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) ("alimony... terminates if the spouse to whom it has been
awarded . . . enters into open concubinage"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977)
("upon proof that the wife is habitually living with a man and holding herself out as his wife,
although not married to such man, [the court] may modify [alimony]"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1289D (West Cum. Supp. 1983) ("[V]oluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a member of
the opposite sex shall be a ground to modify provisions. . . for alimony. . . . Cohabitation means
the dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and woman who are in a private conjugal
relationship."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 507 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1984) ("[no alimony awardable
to dependent spouse if] such petitioner has entered into cohabitation with a person of the opposite
sex who is not a member of the petitioner's immediate family within degrees of consanguinity");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(a)(3) (Supp. 1984) ("where. . . the alimony recipient lives with a
third person, a rebuttable presumption is thereby raised that: the third person is contributing to the
support of the alimony recipient. . . or. . . [t]he third person is receiving support from the alimony
recipient. . . and the court therefore should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the
former spouse"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(3) (1984) ("alimony . . . shall be terminated upon
. . . establishing that the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship or association between them
is without any sexual contact").
These statutes vary substantially in their requirements and effects. Some automatically terminate alimony upon proof of cohabitation (Ala., Ill., Pa.), while others allow modification instead of
termination (Cal., Conn., Ga., Okla., Tenn.). Most of the statutes require that the cohabitation be
with a member of the opposite sex (Ala., Cal., Ga., N.Y., Okla., Pa., Utah), and some require specifically the existence of a sexual relationship between the cohabitants (Ga., I11., La., Okla., Utah).
Several states require that the cohabitation be continuous (Ga., Ill., N.Y., Okla.), although no exact
length of time is specified in any of the statutes. Open cohabitation is required in several states (Ala.,
Ga., Cal., N.Y.). In some states proof of cohabitation and proof of changed financial circumstances
are necessary to warrant alimony modification (Cal., Conn., Tenn.), and in two states proof of cohabitation creates a rebuttable presumption that financial circumstances have changed (Cal., Tenn.).
For a review of cohabitation statutes, see Note, Alimony, Cohabitation and the Wages of Sin: A
Statutory Analysis, 33 ALA. L. REv. 577 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wages of Sin].
Constitutional challenges have been raised against these statutes on equal protection (cohabiting ex-spouses singled out for discriminatory treatment), due process (automatic termination of
property rights), and invasion of privacy grounds (cohabitation is a protected intimate relationship).
See id. at 608, 611. Courts have "uniformly dismissed constitutional attacks launched against
them." Id. at 608; see, eg., Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1983) (constitutional challenge
to Oklahoma cohabitation statute based on equal protection and due process grounds dismissed as
"ludicrous").
Application of these statutes has revealed many problems. Cohabitation statutes have been
criticized widely because they "either limit modification too severely, enable easy circumvention, or
contain language sufficiently broad to confuse both the courts and the parties involved."
Wadlington, supra note 8, at 269.
19. Sea eg., B.W.D. v. B.A.D., 436 A.2d 1263 (Del. 1981) (cohabitation does not terminate
alimony automatically, but can be a substantial changed circumstance warranting modification);
Gayets v. Gayets, 92 N.J. 149, 456 A.2d 102 (1983) (cohabitation is a changed circumstance, but
modification depends on whether financial needs have changed); Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905
(S.D. 1980) (cohabitation is only a factor to be considered in determining modification); Van Gorder
v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983) (all circumstances, including cohabitation,
must be considered in modification decisions); see also Note, Cohabitation Alone is Insufficient
Groundfor Termination of Maintenance, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 605 (1982) (analyzing Van Gorder
decision) [hereinafter cited as Note, CohabitationAlone is Insufficient]; Note, Cohabitation Not
Groundsfor Modification Absent Showing ofRecipient's Reduced FinancialNeeds, 15 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 1324 (1981) (analyzing Myhre decision) [hereinafter cited as Note, CohabitingNot Groundsfor
Modification].
20. Oldham, supra note 5, at 650.
21. See, eg., McHann v. McHann, 383 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1980) ("appellant. . . forfeited
her right to future support. . . because her admitted adultery was of sufficient duration and frequency"); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984) ("obligation to
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"changed circumstances" view, 2 2 however, alimony is modified only upon proof
that the cohabiting dependent spouse's financial needs have changed; 23 cohabitation alone is not considered a changed circumstance sufficient to warrant automatic alimony modification.
The minority rule has been characterized as punitive in nature; the dependent spouse is "punished" for post-divorce sexual activity by a cessation of alimony payments. 24 Automatic alimony termination also may reflect an
unexpressed state view that cohabitation is a form of de facto marriage: 25 that
is, cohabitation is considered a functional legal substitute for remarriage. Thus,
because alimony generally terminates automatically upon remarriage of the dependent spouse, 26 cohabitation also is deemed to justify automatic
27
termination.
Whatever the underlying rationale, automatic alimony termination is an
pay future maintenance is terminated . . . if the party receiving maintenance cohabits"); UTAH
the former spouse is
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(3) (1984) ("alimony . . .shall be terminated. . . [if]
residing with a person of the opposite sex"). Oldham refers to the automatic termination concept as
the "moral outrage" view. Oldham, supra note 5, at 650.
22. Oldham, supra note 5, at 650. Oldham refers to this majority view as the "traditional"
approach because it employs the traditional changed circumstances test for alimony modification.
See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
23. See, e.g., Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9 (D.C. 1977) (modification of alimony not a
punishment for cohabitation but warranted only upon changed financial needs); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
418 A.2d 1140 (Me. 1980) (only financial factors may be considered in a petition for modification);
In re Marriage of Vaughn, 25 Or. App. 655, 550 P.2d 1243 (1976) (cohabitation justifies alimony
modification only if it results in substantially changed financial circumstances); see also CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4801.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (alimony modifiable "[u]pon a determination that circumstances have changed"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (alimony
modifiable "because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the
financial needs of that party").
24. Oldham, supra note 5, at 650. This rationale is reminiscent of the dum sola et casta vixerit
clauses historically included in English divorce decrees. The clauses freed the supporting spouse
from the duty to pay alimony if the dependent spouse was proven unchaste or otherwise morally
derelict. See Wadlington, supra note 8, at 265.
25. Oldham, supra note 5, at 635. A de facto marriage is a relationship having all the attributes
of legal marriage: support, sexual relations, and shared activities. The only difference is that there
has been no ceremonial or legal recognition of the relationship. For an argument favoring the recognition of de facto marriage as a ground for alimony termination, see the vehement dissent in Lydic v.
dissenting) (arguing that the dependent
Lydic, 664 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (Miller, J.,
spouse "[has] not remarried in a traditional sense, but has chosen a lifestyle having the attributes of
marriage... as permanent as a matrimonial affair," and thus that alimony should be terminated).
26. H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 457. Termination of alimony is automatic upon remarriage
primarily because the new spouse is presumed to assume the obligation to support the dependent
spouse. Id.
27. New York's cohabitation statute is apparently based on the de facto marriage theory. The
statute requires more than mere cohabitation: the cohabitants must hold themselves out as husband
and wife before alimony modification is allowed. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977).
Cases interpreting the statute have refused consistently to modify alimony solely on proof of cohabitation. See, eg., Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978)
(refusing to modify alimony to cohabiting dependent spouse because dependent spouse was not holding herself out as wife of third party). Thus, under the New York statute, alimony will be terminated only if the cohabitation is the functional equivalent of remarriage.
This statute and the decisions interpreting it have stirred much controversy. See Note, Alimony
Modification. Cohabitationof an Ex-Wife with Another Man, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 471 (1979) (discussing New York statute and Northrup decision). The rigid "holding out" requirement of the statute yielded an interesting result in Kenney v. Kenney, 76 Misc. 2d 927, 352 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1974). The court concluded that a lesbian relationship could not trigger alimony modification
under the statute because the cohabitants could not hold themselves out as "husband and wife."
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unworkable solution to the problem because it ignores the premises upon which
current alimony law rests. If modem alimony is recognized as an attempt to
alleviate the dependent spouse's financial need,2 8 mere proof of the dependent
spouse's cohabitation does nothing to demonstrate that the dependent spouse's
financial need has decreased. 29 This approach presumes that the third-party cohabitant has assumed financial responsibility for the dependent spouse in the
same way a new spouse assumes a duty of support after marrying the dependent
spouse. 30 Although there has been a recent trend towards recognition of legally
enforceable rights between cohabitants, 3 1 cohabitants, unlike married persons,
28. See supra text accompanying note 11.
29. The possible harsh results of applying an inflexible, automatic termination policy are illustrated by the facts in Wight v. Wight, 284 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1981). In Wight the supporting spouse
sought modification based on the dependent spouse's cohabitation with a third party. The dependent
spouse had sustained brain damage from beatings suffered at the hands of the supporting spouse
during their marriage. As a result, she frequently fainted and thus needed the third party to help her
at home. The court refused to reduce the alimony payments. Another possible harsh result is illustrated by the facts in Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980). In Knuteson the dependent
spouse was forced to move out of her home because the supporting spouse had failed to make alimony payments and, as a consequence, the dependent spouse's electricity, water, and gas had been
cut off. The supporting spouse then sought to have alimony terminated under the state's cohabitation statute, because the dependent spouse had moved into the home of a third party. The court
denied the modification.
Automatic termination may produce the harshest results in those jurisdictions where the
threshold cohabitation necessary to trigger such termination is poorly defined. The possibility is
greater in these states that alimony may be terminated based on temporary liaisons between the
dependent spouse and a third party.
30. Although "[e]xperience tells us that one cohabitant will support the other during their relationship. . . the same cannot be said after they have separated." Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1151.
In many cases avoidance of the support obligation may have been one of the primary reasons for the
parties' decision to cohabit instead of marry. Oldham, supra note 20, at 265 & n.60.
31. Oldham notes that there has been "an avalanche of cases involving various legal issues
related to unmarried cohabitants." Oldham, supra note 5, at 615. Although there is an increasing
tendency to recognize legally enforceable rights between cohabitants, and between cohabitants and
the state, these rights still are minimal at best. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
LAW AGREEMENTS 164-82 (1984). The leading case recognizing enforceable contractual agreements between cohabitants is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106
(1976); see also Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976) (express oral contracts between
cohabitants, exchanging domestic services for property acquired during the relationship held enforceable).
Some courts enforce express contracts between cohabitants. Implied contracts are not enforced
in some jurisdictions on the ground that enforcement effectively would revive the concept of common-law marriage, thereby violating the public policy of those states that have abolished commonlaw marriage. See, eg., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1980). Some courts, however, refuse to recognize any agreements between cohabitants on the
ground that recognition would violate a public policy supporting marriage. See Rehak v. Mathis,
239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (refusing to enforce an agreement exchanging domestic services
for property between parties who had cohabited for 18 years because cohabitation was immoral and
thus unenforceable consideration for the contract); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(1979) (recognition of property rights between cohabitants would violate state policy). But cf. Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C. 1984) ("[The position that courts will not participate in
resolving the disputes [between cohabitants is] . . . unrealistic and unresponsive to social need.").
For a review of case law dealing with contracts between cohabitants, see Knauer v. Knauer, 470
A.2d 553, 560-64 (Pa. Super. 1983).
One commentator characterized current law dealing with cohabitants as follows: "American
law treats cohabitants in a lopsided fashion. In dispensing economic benefits [such as workers' compensation and social security]. . . it ignores unmarried cohabitation. In imposing economic disability, [such as terminating alimony payments] it more often than not equates unmarried cohabitation
with marriage." Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1137-38.
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generally are unable to impose support obligations on each other when their
relationship ends.32 Because alimony usually cannot be reinstated once the cohabitation relationship ends, 33 automatic termination of alimony on proof of
cohabitation may leave the dependent spouse without needed financial sup34
port-a result at odds with the original grant of the alimony award.
The majority rule-which allows modification or termination of alimony
only upon proof of changed circumstances-is more reasonable. Under this approach the alimony award may be modified only if it is clear that the financial
needs of the dependent spouse have decreased; 35 alimony cannot be modified
solely on proof of cohabitation. If the dependent spouse is cohabiting and receiving support from a third party, the financial needs of the dependent spouse
may have decreased sufficiently to warrant reduction or termination of alimony
payments. 36 If a dependent spouse is supporting or helping to support a third
party with alimony funds, such support also may demonstrate a lack of need
sufficient to justify reduction of alimony payments.3 7 If alimony is modified
32. Wadlington, supra note 8, at 270; see also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me.
1980) (cohabitants have neither legal support obligations nor any right to demand support).
33. Oldham, supra note 5, at 645; see, eg., In re Support of Halford, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 609, 388
N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1979) (court interpreted state's cohabitation statute to apply only to cohabitation that rises to the level of de facto marriage, thereby terminating permanently all future alimony
just as legal remarriage would terminate alimony obligation).
34. The consequences sought to be avoided by the original award of alimony then may occur.
For example, the dependent spouse may be forced to seek support from the state. See H. CLARK,
supra note 9, at 441. One commentator noted that the automatic termination policy ultimately may
increase the length of time over which the supporting spouse must pay alimony. With such severe
economic penalties for "trial relationships," a dependent spouse may be less willing to form new
relationships and thus less likely to remarry and relieve the supporting spouse of the alimony obligation. Oldham, supra note 5, at 639.
35. See, eg., Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert denied, 328
So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1976); Sovel v. Sovel, 6 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2704 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1980); Abbott v.
Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1979).
The "changed circumstances" language also has been used as a pretext by courts to impose
moral sanctions. In McRae v. McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Miss. 1980), the dependent spouse
lived with a third party who was separated, but not yet divorced. The Mississippi Supreme Court
terminated alimony payments, stating that dependent spouse's
abode with the man for more than a year, openly living in adultery, enduring the embarrassment of it, and, in addition by silence, setting that kind of example before her daughters
constituted a material change in the circumstances of the parties and that, by her unconscionable conduct, she forfeited her right to future alimony.
Similarly, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 5 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2127,2127 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1978),
the court concluded that "[recipient's] post-decree lesbianism is a material change in circumstances
which justifies the termination of alimony."
36. See, eg., Fahrer v. Fahrer, 36 Ohio App. 2d 208, 304 N.E.2d 411 (1973). In Fahrerdependent spouse and a third party maintained joint checking and savings accounts, were the beneficiaries
of each other's insurance policies, and used the same surname. The couple had applied for a marriage license, but admitted that they had not gone through with the ceremony so that dependent
spouse could continue receiving alimony payments. The court presumed that the third party was
capable of supporting dependent spouse and terminated alimony.
37. See, eg,, Hall v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 524, 323 N.E.2d 541 (1975) (dependent spouse paid
mortgage, real estate taxes, insurance, and utility bills; third party lived in dependent spouse's home
but paid no rent). In Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975), the court,
concerned that dependent spouse might give support to or receive support from the third party,
adopted a test that provided for alimony modification on proof of the existence of either situation.
One commentator concluded that adoption of such a test "protect[s] the former spouse from incidentally supporting an unforeseen third party and prevent[s] the alimony recipient from receiving unneeded support." Note, The Effect of Third PartyCohabitationon Alimony Payments, 15 TULSA L.J.
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under this rule, it typically is only reduced or suspended, not permanently terminated. Alimony is reinstatable if the cohabitation relationship ends or the finan38
cial need of the dependent spouse is reestablished.
Although this approach deemphasizes the punitive aspects of the minority
approach, it is not without problems. Under the majority rule cohabitants who
agree to share expenses can create "an apparent perpetual support need, even if
need for support does not exist."' 39 If expenses are carefully kept separate, no
"changed circumstances" warranting a modification of alimony will arise,
regardless of the length of the cohabitation or the wealth of the individual cohabitants. 4° Thus, "the seemingly benign formula that reduces a support obligation according to reduction of the [dependent spouse's] economic needs is
unworkable. Any sensible [dependent spouse] will make certain that her economic contribution to the new household equals her monthly income from alimony and other sources." 4 1 As long as the dependent spouse and the third
party keep their finances separate, alimony payments cannot be reduced on the
grounds of changed circumstances, even if the dependent spouse actually derives
a financial benefit from the cohabitation relationship.
772, 779 (1979); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(a)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1984) (raises rebuttable
presumption upon proof of cohabitation that "[t]he third person is contributing to the support of the
[dependent spouse]" or "[t]hat the third person is receiving support from the [dependent spouse]").

The sense of injustice to the supporting spouse that arises upon proof of either situation has
been the impetus for some of the recent development in this area of the law. One court noted that
the purpose of Utah's cohabitation statute is to "prevent injustice to a [supporting] spouse who
frequently pays through the nose . . . to an undeserving [dependent] spouse." Knuteson v.
Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980). Another court noted that "there is something distasteful in
requiring one to subsidize a former spouse, in his or her subsequent cohabitation." Lydic v. Lydic,
664 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting). In O'Connor v. O'Connor, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 90, 114 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1974), the court stated that "the former husband is understandably
chagrined at supporting his ex-wife's 'boyfriend.'" Most states are not concerned with the simple
sharing of household expenses between the dependent spouse and a third party. If they were, states
also would recognize roommate situations as justifying modification of alimony. Obviously, the cen-

tral concern is that alimony benefits might be shared with a cohabitant-lover at the supporting
spouse's expense.
38. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1151 (if cohabiting couple separates, obligor spouse's sup.
port obligations should survive); Oldham supranote 20, at 268; see also Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137
N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (alimony revivable upon termination
of the cohabitation relationship if need is reestablished); Taake v. Taake, 75 Wis. 2d 115, 233
N.W.2d 449 (1975) (abuse of discretion for trial court to bar all future alimony). The California
statute allows alimony to be reinstated after a suspension based on cohabitation: "Nothing in this
section shall preclude later modification of support upon proof of change in circumstances." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4801.5(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1985). In support of suspension and revival of alimony
payments, one student commentator has noted:
Three distinct parties would benefit from limited revival of alimony: the payor would be
allowed some degree of economic freedom while payment is suspended even though the
support obligation might become effective again after a re-hearing to establish need; the
recipient would not be penalized for sexual conduct and would have a source for support if
need could be re-established; and the state's interest in preventing the payee's dependence
on state welfare funds would be protected.
Note, supra note 37, at 789.
39. Oldham, supra note 5, at 617.
40. Id. at 623; see also Porter v. Porter, 137 Vt. 375, 406 A.2d 398 (1979) (although dependent
spouse cohabited seven years and had two children by a third party who was helping to support the
children, court denied modification of alimony because cohabitants shared expenses).
41. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1150.
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Some states have dealt with this problem by shifting the burden of proof of
changed circumstances to the dependent spouse once cohabitation between that

spouse and a third party has been established. If the supporting spouse establishes that the dependent spouse is cohabiting, a rebuttable presumption of

changed circumstances arises; to overcome this presumption the dependent
spouse must prove that financial circumstances have not changed during the

cohabitation period. 42 Shifting the burden of proof in this manner, however,

may not reduce significantly the ability of cohabitants to circumvent modifica-

tion if they scrupulously keep their finances separate. 4 3 In these situations,

courts have had difficulty formulating satisfactory justifications for modifying

alimony obligations. 44
Another criticism frequently voiced is that the majority rule discourages
remarriage and encourages cohabitation because it allows alimony payments to
42. California and Tennessee have adopted this rebuttable presumption approach by statute.
See supra note 20; see also Grossman v. Grossman, 128 N.J. Super. 193, 319 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (rebuttable presuniption concept adopted judicially). The rationale underlying
the rebuttable presumption approach is that because information on the finances of the cohabitants is
relatively inaccessible to the supporting spouse and a changed circumstances test may be circurvented with relative ease by cohabitants sharing expenses, the burden should be shifted to the dependent spouse to prove that financial need has not decreased. Although such a presumption may not
always be justified, it provides some protection to the supporting spouse by "instruct[ing] the court
to redetermine the financial needs of the recipient spouse." Note, Wages ofSin, supra note 18, at
596. But cf. Note, CohabitationNot Groundsfor Modification, supra note 19, at 1334 (contending
that burden of proof should not be shifted because "the [dependent spouse's] need for enforcement of
the legal right to support clearly outweighs the interest in the accessibility of facts").
43. See, eg., In re Lieb, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978) (changed financial
circumstances could not be established, even under California's rebuttable presumption approach;
nevertheless, supporting spouse's alimony payments suspended on equitable grounds).
44. The holding in In re Lieb, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978), illustrates this
difficulty. In Lieb dependent spouse cohabited with a third party for two years, during which time
dependent spouse was unemployed and the third party was employed. Expenses were kept separate
by the cohabitants. Names, bank accounts, and properties also were kept separate. Thus, the apparent need for alimony payments was not reduced. The court suspended alimony payments, even
though California applies the traditional changed circumstances approach and invokes a rebuttable
presumption of reduced financial need, on the theory that a dependent spouse could not give domestic services to the third party free of charge, at the supporting spouse's expense. Although the
dependent spouse "has the undoubted right to give her [domestic] services to [the third party, she]
S.. has no right to ask a court to collect for her from her former husband spousal support in a sum
sufficient to enable her to make the gift." Id. at 642, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
In B.W.D. v. B.A.D., 436 A.2d 1263 (Del. 1981), the court struggled with the application of the
traditional approach. Dependent spouse lived with a third party for three years, during which time
they moved from an apartment to a four-bedroom house purchased by the third party. The cohabitants shared the expenses of furnishing and maintaining the home, as well as food and vacation
expenses. An evenly divided court upheld the application of the changed circumstances test but
reduced alimony, even in light of the evidence that expenses had been "shared." One judge expressed dissatisfaction with the changed circumstances approach as applied to this situation, noting
that dependent spouse
has all the benefits of cohabitation. . . while she continues to enjoy the alimony provided
by her first husband. That seems to us to be a fraud on the Statute which terminates
alimony upon remarriage and, clearly, it is unfair to the former spouse who is required by
the Court to help underwrite the new relationship.
Id. at 1266 (Duffy, J., controlling opinion for an equally divided court).
One commentator has suggested that the problem presented by cohabitants who technically
keep their finances separate but are in fact benefitting from mutual support can "be satisfactorily
resolved only by treating all the cohabitant's uncommitted income as available to the [dependent]
spouse." Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1151.
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continue to the cohabiting dependent spouse. 45 The cohabitants are "rewarded"
economically for avoiding marriage by the continuation of alimony payments.
Conversely, the remarriage of the dependent spouse would be "punished" by
the strong public policy
termination of such payments. This result contravenes
46
in many states favoring the marital relationship.
Several solutions have been proposed to the problems of both the majority
and minority approaches. 4 7 One writer has suggested replacing the widely accepted principle that alimony terminates automatically upon remarriage with a
strict financial needs test: alimony would be reduced or terminated only upon a
showing of changed financial need, regardless of the dependent spouse's marital
status. Under this view cohabitation would not be encouraged in preference to
marriage because alimony would not terminate automatically upon remarriage. 4 8 Another writer has suggested that alimony payments should be reduced
or suspended automatically on proof of cohabitation, but courts should be able
to reinstate payments upon termination of cohabitation if need is reestablished
by the dependent spouse. 4 9 Still another commentator has suggested that all
equitable factors, including the "length of the marriage, the length of the cohabitation, the amount of property of the [dependent spouse] received in connection
with the divorce, whether the [dependent spouse] has custody of any children,
and the earning capacities of the [supporting spouse] and the [third party cohabitant]," should be considered by the court.50 Under this approach, if the cohabitation has been of significant duration and the third-party cohabitant is
financially capable of supporting the dependent spouse, the alimony payments
would be suspended for the duration of the cohabitation.5 1
North Carolina currently has no statute that deals specifically with the
problem of alimony modification in the context of cohabiting dependent spouses.
45. See, eg., Note, CohabitationAlone is Insufficient Ground, supra note 19, at 620 (noting that
dependent spouse "has little to lose and much to gain by cohabiting").
46. Oldham, supra note 5, at 638.
47. Another problem that frequently arises in a cohabitation context involves separation agreements adopted by divorcing couples that are not modifiable by the courts. If the agreement is a legal,
arm's length contract between the supporting and dependent spouse, created without fraud or duress, courts generally will enforce the agreement according to its terms. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Whiteley, 329 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1976) (enforcing a provision restricting any adult male from living in the
marital home with the dependent spouse). If the separation agreement does not specifically list
cohabitation as one of the conditions triggering alimony modification, a court will not interfere with
the terms of the separation agreement to allow modification based on cohabitation. Wadlington,
supra note 8, at 273; see also Riddle v. Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977) (court refused
to look beyond specific terms of separation agreement---cohabitation rejected as grounds for modification). Separation agreement provisions permitting alimony modification must be worded carefully. In O'Connor Bros. Abalone Co. v. Brando, 40 Cal. App. 3d 90, 114 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1974), the
separation agreement provided that alimony payments could be terminated if dependent spouse appeared "to maintain a marital relationship with any person." Id. at 93, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 774. A
court battle ensued over whether dependent spouse's cohabitation was similar enough to a "marital
relationship" to warrant terminating alimony. For a discussion of the Brando case, see Wadlington,
supra note 8, at 274-76.
48. Langbein, Post-DissolutionCohabitation: The Best of Both Worlds?, 57 FLA. B.J. 656, 658
(1983).
49. Wadlington, supra note 8, at 270.
50. Oldham, supra note 5, at 642.
51. Id. at 636.
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Alimony has been awardable upon absolute divorce 52 in North Carolina since
196753 based on one of the ten grounds enumerated in North Carolina General

Statutes section 50-16.2.54 Although the fault of the parties may be taken into

consideration in determining the alimony award, 5 5 alimony is awarded primar-

ily for demonstrated need, not "as a punishment for a broken marriage."' 56 Alimony automatically terminates upon the death of either party 57 or the
58
remarriage of the dependent spouse.
In North Carolina alimony awards are modifiable based on changed circumstances;5 9 the burden of proving changed circumstances is upon the party
seeking to modify the alimony award. 6° These changed circumstances are the
same circumstances considered in determining the amount of the original
award. 6 1 The court considers "[tihe estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living of the parties, and other facts of the particu-

lar case." 62 Petition for modification may be made if the financial need of the
63
dependent spouse or the ability to pay of the supporting spouse has changed.

52. Alimony also is awardable upon "limited" divorce---also known as "alimony without divorce." Limited divorce is a legal separation without an actual termination of the marital relationship. Temporary alimony-alimony "pendente lite"-may be awarded pending and during the
divorce process. 2 R. LEE, supra note 7, at 191.
53. Id. at 188. North Carolina recognizes a duty of support only between persons who are
"legally married." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1984). North Carolina law concerning cohabitant
rights is largely undeveloped. Contracts, if legally enforceable between two parties, are not invalid
simply because they are contracts between cohabitants, Collins v. Davis, 68 N.C. App. 588, 315
S.E.2d 759 (1984), unless supported by immoral consideration, Brown v. Kinsey, 81 N.C. 245
(1879).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984).
55. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 182, 261 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1980). North Carolina
recently joined, to a limited extent, the nationwide trend towards eliminating fault considerations in
divorce laws. In 1983 North Carolina abolished its fault-based grounds for divorce, making a one
year separation the sole grounds for divorce. Law of July 15, 1983, ch. 613, § 1, 1983 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 42 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984)). Some commentators contend that nofault divorce also should signal the end of fault-based alimony awards. See Note, Does No-Fault
Divorce PortendNo-Fault Alimony?, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 484 (1973); see also Marschall, Proposed
Reforms in Divorce Law, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 43-45 (1976) (proposing elimination of fault considerations from North Carolina General Statutes).
56. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 187, 261 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1980). Alimony is determined by the needs of the dependent spouse and the ability of the supporting spouse to pay. Sprinkle
v. Sprinkle, 17 N.C. App. 175, 182, 193 S.E.2d 468, 474 (1972).
57. 2 R. LEE, supra note 7, at 246.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1984).
59. Id. § 50-16.9. "[Alimony] may be modified or vacated at any time, upon. . . a showing of
changed circumstances." Id § 50-16.9(a). This power to modify includes the power to terminate
the alimony award. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967). Alimony awards may
not be modified absent a showing of changed circumstances. Vandooren v. Vandooren, 27 N.C.
App. 279, 218 S.E.2d 715 (1975). A supporting spouse cannot artificially create a change in circumstances by purposely reducing income-in such cases, the alimony obligation will be based on earning capacity instead of actual earnings. Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 179 S.E.2d 144
(1971).
60. Gill v. Gill, 29 N.C. App. 20, 222 S.E.2d 754 (1976). The moving party must prove that the
award is "either inadequate or unduly burdensome." Medlin v. Medlin, 64 N.C. App. 600, 602, 307
S.E.2d 591, 592 (1983).
61. Rowe v. Rowe, 51 N.C. App. 646, 654, 280 S.E.2d 182, 187 (1981), rev'd on other grounds,
305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5(a) (1984).
63. Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 271 S.E.2d 921 (1980). Comparisons based solely on
incomes of the parties are insufficient to support a finding of changed circumstances. The court must
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The court is required to compare the totality of circumstances at the time of the

original award with the overall circumstances at the time modification is
sought; 64 the changed circumstances must be substantial 65 and must relate to

financial need. 6 6 Modification is not allowed for "fluctuations in income
alone." 67
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that the postdivorce sexual activities of the dependent spouse are grounds for alimony modification. In Stallings v. Staiings6 8 the court of appeals held that post-divorce

sexual activity does not constitute a changed circumstance sufficient to affect
alimony payments. In Stallings the supporting spouse petitioned for a modification of alimony because a third party was staying at the home of the dependent
spouse five or six nights each month, and the dependent spouse engaged in sexual intercourse with the third party on those occasions. 69 The court rejected the
petition, stating that North Carolina has no statute which allows modification of
alimony awards "solely because of post-marital fornication." 70 The court noted
that modification is allowed under section 50-16.9 only upon a showing of
changed circumstances that "bear upon the financialneeds of the [parties], ' 7 1
and that the "post marital conduct of either party has no relevance" to changed
circumstances. 72 The court also emphasized that under North Carolina law,
only remarriage, not sexual conduct, justifies termination of alimony to a depen73
dent spouse.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue of the effect
of cohabitation by a dependent spouse upon the alimony obligation. Several
court of appeals decisions, however, have addressed the issue. In Shankle v.
Shankle74 the dependent spouse cohabited for five years with a third party while
consider "the present overall circumstances of the parties ...

compared with the circumstances

existing at the time of the original award .... " Id. at 474, 271 S.E.2d at 928.

64. Broughton v. Broughton, 58 N.C. App. 778, 781, 294 S.E.2d 772, 775, cert. denied, 307
N.C. 269, 299 S.E.2d 214 (1982).
65. Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982).
66. Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966).
67. Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 472, 271 S.E.2d 921, 927 (1980).
68. 36 N.C. App. 643, 244 S.E.2d 494, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 648, 248 S.E.2d 249 (1978).
69. Id. at 644, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 645, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
72. Id. Absent a clause in the separation agreement barring sexual activities of a dependent
spouse, sexual activity after the execution of a separation agreement but before a decree for absolute
divorce will not affect the alimony award in such agreement. Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party:
Spousal Support, PrivateAgreements and the State, 59 N.C.L. Rav. 819, 845 (1981). Post-divorce
sexual relations between ex-husband and ex-wife (and cohabitation), however, even if infrequent, will
void a separation agreement and terminate alimony obligations. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390,
245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
73. The court stated:
The Legislature has seen fit to provide that if a dependent spouse receiving alimony under
an order of a court of the state shall remarry, the right to alimony shall terminate .... If
so inclined, the Legislature could have added other conditions under which the award
could be terminated. It did not do so.
Stallings, 36 N.C. App. at 645, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
74. 26 N.C. App. 565, 216 S.E.2d 915, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 246, 217 S.E.2d 670 (1975).
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continuing to receive alimony payments. 7 5 The dependent spouse admitted that
during this time she generally was known as the wife of the third party. 76 When
the third party died the dependent spouse received rights to the entire income
from his estate for ten years, as well as inheritance rights to the entire estate,
valued in excess of $130,000, at the end of the ten-year period. 7 7 Despite this
evidence, the trial court rejected the supporting spouse's contention that
changed circumstances as well as the "remarriage" of the dependent spouse war78
ranted a termination of alimony payments.
The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that "there
was some evidence to support [the supporting spouse's] assertion that there has
been a change in [the dependent spouse's] financial circumstances."'79 In discussing the supporting spouse's contention that the dependent spouse essentially
had remarried and thus alimony should be terminated, the court noted that,
80
although North Carolina does not recognize common-law marriage, circumstantial evidence such as "'reputation, cohabitation, [and] the declarations and
conduct of the parties'" may be used to prove a ceremonial marriage.8 1 The
court, however, did not reach the question of whether the facts were sufficient to
establish a ceremonial marriage justifying termination of alimony under the re82
marriage statute.
The court of appeals also has held that proof of cohabitation is not sufficient
to modify or terminate the alimony obligations established in a separation agreement if the agreement does not specify cohabitation as a ground for modification
or termination. In Riddle v. Riddle8 3 the dependent spouse claimed a breach of
provisions of a separation agreement providing for payment of alimony until the
dependent spouse died or remarried. 84 The supporting spouse argued that the
dependent spouse was circumventing the intent of the agreement by cohabiting
85
with a third party and "enjoying all the benefits of the marital relationship."
The court rejected the supporting spouse's claim that alimony payments should
be modified, holding that "[u]nder the agreement, [the dependent spouse's] rela75. Id. at 567, 216 S.E.2d at 917.
76. The dependent spouse used her cohabitant's name as a member of a local country club. Id.
77. Id. at 567, 216 S.E.2d at 917-18.
78. Id. at 567, 216 S.E.2d at 918.
79. Id. at 569, 216 S.E.2d at 919.
80. Id. at 568, 216 S.E.2d at 918.
81. Id. at 569, 216 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting Jones v. Reddick, 79 N.C. 290, 292 (1878)).
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The court did note that there was sufficient
evidence to support an allegation of remarriage. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial court to direct a
verdict for dependent spouse on this point. Shankle, 26 N.C. App. at 569, 216 S.E.2d at 919. Interestingly, the court seemed to be suggesting an approach analogous to the New York "holding out"
statute. See supra note 27. Under this view, cohabitation alone is not sufficient, but if there is
evidence that the couple behaved as husband and wife, they will be deemed to have "ceremonially"
married, and alimony then may be terminated under the remarriage statute. See, eg., Green v.
Eastern Constr. Co., 1 N.C. App. 300, 161 S.E.2d 200 (1968) (evidence that cohabitants lived together for years, were known generally as husband and wife in the community and by husband's
employer, and "husband" included cohabitant as "wife" on federal income tax forms held sufficient
to prove a ceremonial marriage, entitling the "wife" to workers' compensation benefits).
83. 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977).
84. Id. at 84, 230 S.E.2d at 810.
85. Id. at 88, 230 S.E.2d at 812.
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tions with other people, short of marriage, do not offer defendant any defense to
the enforcement of its provisions. The separation agreement must be enforced
'86
according to its own terms."

Similarly, in Sethness v. Sethness 87 the court of appeals refused to look beyond the terms of a separation agreement to determine whether alimony pay-

ments should be modified.8 8 In Sethness the supporting spouse alleged that the
dependent spouse had "lewdly and lasciviously associated, bedded and cohab-

ited with a man."'8 9 The supporting spouse sought to set aside the separation

agreement on the ground that such conduct violated public policy. 90 The court

rejected this argument, noting that under the terms of the separation agreement
cohabitation was not a ground upon which alimony could be modified: 91 "We
do not condone illicit cohabitation or illicit intercourse and we note that such
acts violate the laws of this state. We cannot say, however, that such acts...
-92
would be cause for voiding the agreement ....
It is clear from these cases that North Carolina follows the majority rule, 9 3

allowing modification of alimony only upon a showing of changed financial circumstances. How can the recognition of cohabitation implicit in this approach 94 be reconciled with the state's antifornication statute, which makes
cohabitation outside marriage a criminally punishable offense? 95 Also, how can
86. Id.
87. 62 N.C. App. 676, 303 S.E.2d 424 (1983).
88. North Carolina courts will not invalidate separation agreements unless they are void at the
time of their creation. "[No separation agreement has ever been declared void on the grounds of
unfairness in a North Carolina court." Sharp, supra note 72, at 832-33.
Historically, North Carolina distinguished between separation agreements that were "adopted"
by the court and those that were simply "approved" by the court. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136
S.E.2d 240 (1964). Adopted agreements were like any other court order-they were modifiable and
enforceable by the court. Id. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. Approved agreements were enforceable only
as ordinary contracts, and were modifiable by the court only upon consent of the parties. Id. This
somewhat artificial distinction was abolished recently by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). In Walters the court held that any separation
agreements brought before the court during divorce proceedings will be considered modifiable. If
the parties desire to retain the nonmodifiable, contractual nature of their separation agreement, they
must keep the agreement out of court. Id. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
Even if the separation agreement is modifiable and changed circumstances warranting modification exist, actual modification of a separation agreement may be quite difficult due to the tendency in
divorce settlements to provide for alimony and property division in one comprehensive scheme. If
the alimony and property provisions of an agreement are inseparable, the agreement may not be
modified-because property divisions are generally nonmodifiable. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 7, at
146. In North Carolina it is presumed that alimony and property provisions are separate unless
proved otherwise.
89. Sethness, 62 N.C. App. at 678, 303 S.E.2d at 426. The supporting spouse's allegation echoes the language of North Carolina's criminal antifornication statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184
(1981), which reads: "If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and
lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." Infractions are punishable "by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars . . . imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both." Id.
90. Sethness, 62 N.C. App. at 678, 303 S.E.2d at 426
91. Id. at 681, 303 S.E.2d at 427-28.
92. Id. at 681, 303 S.E.2d at 428.
93. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 45.
95. See supra note 89.
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the traditional approach, which may encourage cohabitation, be squared with
North Carolina's public policies supporting marriage and rejecting
96
cohabitation?
Because allowing alimony payments to continue to a non-needy cohabiting
dependent spouse is an implicit condonation of the cohabitation relationship, the
changed circumstances approach, as currently applied, is irreconcilable with
North Carolina's antifornication statute. Implicit condonation of the cohabitation relationship also is inconsistent with the public policy supporting marriage
because the changed circumstances approach as currently applied encourages
97
cohabitation in preference to remarriage.
Adoption of legislation9" aimed specifically at the problem of cohabiting
dependent spouses would best resolve these conflicts. The simplest legislative
solution would be to add cohabitation to the existing statutory framework as a
special changed circumstance warranting alimony modification. Such a statute
could read as follows:99
(1) Upon a showing that a dependent spouse is cohabiting with a
third party, the court shall consider all relevant equitable factors including but not limited to:
(a) the length of the prior marriage;
(b) the length of the cohabitation;
(c) the estate, earnings, and earning capacity of the supporting spouse;
(d) the estate, earnings, and earning capacity of the third
party; and
(e) the financial needs of the dependent spouse.
(2) If the totality of circumstances examined in subsection (1)
indicates that the dependent spouse's financial needs have decreased,
the court may suspend or reduce alimony payments accordingly.
(3) Alimony payments may be reinstated by the court at any
96. North Carolina courts have made clear their condemnation of cohabitation. See, eg., Collins v. Davis, 68 N.C. App. 588, 593, 315 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1984) ("we disapprove of plaintiff's...
immoral liaison with defendant"); Sethness, 62 N.C. App. at 681, 303 S.E.2d at 428 ('we do not
condone illicit cohabitation").
97. In Fleming v. Fleming, 221 Kan. 290, 559 P.2d 329 (1977), Judge Schroeder's vehement
dissent argued that not terminating alimony because of cohabitation conflicts with state antifornication statutes and is contrary to public policy. Id. at 293-94, 559 P.2d at 332-33 (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting). Most states have repealed their antifornication statutes, Oldham, supra note 5, at 650,
and existing statutes seldom are enforced. See Fineman, Law and Changing Patternsof Behavior
Sanctions of Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV.275, 285-98.
98. Legislation addressing the alimony-cohabitation problem was introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly in 1983. The legislation proposed amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9
(1976) by adding a new subsection, providing that:
Evidence that a party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex shall be admissible to
show changed circumstances pursuant to (a) or (c). Holding oneself out to be the husband
or wife of the person with whom one is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this section.
H.R. 520, 1983 N.C. Gen. Assembly (introduced March 24, 1983, by Representatives Rabon and
Lancaster). The bill died in committee.
99. Portions of this proposed statute are drawn from Oldham's model statute, see Oldham
supra note 5, at 653-54.
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time pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) upon proof of changed circumstances resulting in the renewed financial need of the dependent
spouse. If alimony payments originally were awarded for a limited period, payments may be reinstated only for the remainder of that time.
(4) Cohabitation, for the purposes of this section, is defined as
the voluntary, continuous residence with a third party for more than
ninety days.
In the proposed statute the consideration of the listed equitable factors, as
well as the discretionary power to consider other relevant factors, allows the
court to inquire into the true financial nature of the cohabitation relationship.lc °
This inquiry will eliminate the problems inherent in the traditional changedcircumstances approach because cohabitants cannot avoid alimony modification
by superficially keeping their finances separate when they are actually providing
for or receiving financial support from each other. The court's closer scrutiny
should uncover any such masked support arrangements. The proposed statute
eliminates financial incentives for the dependent spouse to cohabit rather than
remarry. This result is consistent with the public policy favoring marriage and
discouraging cohabitation.' 0 1
Such scrutiny also ensures that alimony will not be terminated to a cohabiting dependent spouse whose financial status has not been improved as a result
of the cohabitation. Consideration of equitable factors thus helps to avoid the
harsh results of automatic alimony termination. If the court determines that the
dependent spouse still is in need of financial support, alimony payments will
continue regardless of the cohabitant's living arrangements. If alimony is suspended or reduced, it may be reinstated upon termination of the cohabitation if
financial need is reestablished.' 0 2
Cohabitation is defined explicitly by the statute to avoid several problems
100. Arguably, North Carolina already has adopted the spirit of the equitable approach by emphasizing consideration of the totality of the circumstances in a modification proceeding. Britt v.
Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 474, 271 S.E.2d 921, 928 (1980). Also, North Carolina courts already look
beyond the surface of the financial relationship between the parties to determine whether modification is warranted. Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 467-68, 179 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1971).
Even the language of the current statute, which allows the court to consider "other facts of the
particular case," indicates a willingness to consider appropriate factors not specified in the statute.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (1984).
101. See supra note 96 (discussing North Carolina's public policy favoring marriage over cohabitation). The proposed statute will not eliminate the dependent spouse's financial incentive to cohabit
with rather than marry the third party: remarriage automatically terminates alimony payments, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text, whereas cohabitation under the proposed statute will terminate alimony only if equitable factors so dictate. The financial incentive to cohabit could be eliminated completely only by accepting equitable rather than automatic alimony termination on
remarriage-an unlikely scenario--or by automatically terminating alimony upon proof of cohabitation.
The proposed statute, while avoiding the problems inherent in the automatic termination approach's attempt to eliminate the dependent spouse's incentive to cohabit-problems such as ignoring the dependent spouse's needs for financial support or shifting them to the state-at the same time
decreases that incentive by requiring that the dependent spouse's true financial support from the
third party be considered.
102. Because North Carolina does not recognize a right of support between cohabitants, support
generally should be reinstated after separation from a cohabitant, upon proof of renewed financial
need, when the dependent spouse originally was adjudged by the State to be in need of such support.
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that frequently arise in the cohabitation context. First, the cohabitation must be
"voluntary"; this requirement avoids invocation of the statute in situations in
which cohabitation is based purely on financial necessity. Second, the cohabitation must be "continuous," precluding application of the statute to situations
involving only intermittent stayovers.10 3 Last, the statute sets a ninety-day minimum for establishment of cohabitation.10 4 Although this time limit is arbitrary, it is an attempt to differentiate between brief liaisons and more permanent
cohabitation relationships.
The overriding principle in resolving questions concerning alimony awards
and their modification is the assurance of fairness to the parties.10 5 In cases
involving a cohabiting dependent spouse, fairness to both parties is best ensured
by providing continued support only to a truly needy dependent spouse, regardless of the spouse's living arrangements. North Carolina must confront these
problems because, as one commentator noted:
Inevitably, divorce law must effect a workable compromise between
conflicting values. ...
If the written law fails to take into account
the legitimate needs of individuals as well as the public concern over
family stability, it is a safe prediction that by custom, fiction, or artifice, litigants and their lawyers will distort the law or find a way to
bypass it. 106
Clear legislative guidelines should define cohabitation and allow courts to
suspend or reduce alimony upon a consideration of the totality of equitable factors comprising changed circumstances. These guidelines would achieve the
twin goals of assuring fairness to both spouses and upholding the traditional
public policy supporting marriage. The proposed statute provides a realistic solution to the problems inherent in modification of alimony to a cohabiting dependent spouse.
CAROLYN SIEvERs REED

103. "Continuous" should be construed broadly to avoid circumvention by contrived periods of
separation.
104. Courts have struggled to determine what length of time is sufficient to constitute cohabitation. See, eg., In re Marriage of Sappington, 123 I1. App. 3d 396, 462 N.E.2d 881 (1984) (intermittent stayovers not sufficient to constitute cohabitation). None of the cohabitation statutes specify a
length of time. One commentator suggested that a 60-day provision would be "sufficient to distinguish a transitory relationship from stable cohabitation." Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1152.
105. Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 474, 271 S.E.2d 921, 928 (1980).
106. Foster, Current Trends in Divorce Law, 1 FAm. L.Q. 21 (1967).

